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Abstract 
Since the introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana in 2003, there has been little evidence with 
regards the type of providers from whom these insured persons seek healthcare. This study examines the choice of 
healthcare providers under the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana, using nine hundred and eighty eight 
(988) insured persons. Stratified random sampling technique was employed in selecting respondents, while the 
multinomial logistic regression was employed. 
facility were found to discourage the use of orthodox healthcare among insured persons. The study recommend that 
social and economic infrastructure such as roads, telecommunication, and health
improved in some cases to make orthodox healthcare providers more accessible and affordable, at the same time, it 
reduce the demand for unorthodox healthcare among the insured persons.
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1. Introduction 
Adequate utilization of healthcare services is important to maintaining a quality life. Economic productivity of any 
nation depends largely on the health of its labour force. This fact dictates that any nation desir
productivity must put in place policies to ensure adequate access to quality healthcare (Kamgnia, 2008; Kouadio, 
Monsan and Gbongue, 2008).  
 
In Ghana, several policy interventions have been executed over the years aimed at improving t
Ghanaians. Components of the seven
example focused on reducing morbidity, mortality and malnutrition among children. The Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP) and Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in the 1980s emphasised primary healthcare and 
preventive care (Aryeetey and Kanbur, 2008). Ghana’s health system has therefore undergone various changes; free 
health care prior to independence, cost sharing in the 1970s
economic reforms.  
 
All these health systems were inadequate in addressing the health needs of Ghanaians. Especially, the full cost 
recovery system resulted in the creation of a financial barrier to
Ghana declared its intention to abolish the system and began exploring the feasibility of introducing a National 
Health Insurance Scheme to be managed at the district/municipal/metropolitan levels (Sul
2003, the National Health Insurance Act (Act 650) was passed, giving mandate to all metropolitans, municipalities 
and districts to set up mutual health insurance schemes. The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) is to provide 
accessible, affordable and good quality healthcare to all Ghanaians especially the poor and vulnerable in society 
(MoH, 2004a).  
 
The NHIS has been running for the past eight years and according to SEND
registered people has been increasing in all the regions since its inception. As at 2009, 14,283,620 card bearing 
Ghanaians representing 69.73% (based on the 2000 Population estimates) have registered with the scheme out of the 
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total population of the country (NHIA, 2009). Fo
payment at the point of health service delivery and hence improved access to health care at public health facilities. 
 
However, the NHIS does not cover all diseases and illnesses and also, it 
be prescribed. Also, besides the explicit costs which are covered under the NHIS, there are also implicit costs which 
are borne by insured persons on NHIS. These, among other factors are likely to play a role wi
of healthcare providers among the NHIS insured persons. In a study of health seeking behaviour among insured 
persons under the social security act, 1990 in Thailand, Sirisinsuk et al. (2003) identified the patterns of health 
seeking behaviours among the participants that confirms the reality that, although they have health insurance, they 
may seek care from other health facilities where they have to be financially responsible for the cost.  Studies 
elsewhere have identified out-of-pocket payments and the individual belief in the competencies of the provider as 
important determinants of the choice of healthcare provider (Hibbard & Weeks, 1987; Odwee, Okurut & Adebua, 
2006; Ngugi, 2008 and Thuan, Lofgen, Lindholm & Chuc, 2008). 
 
There has however not been any empirical study that has established the determinants of choice of healthcare 
providers among NHIS insured persons in Ghana. If the health seeking behaviour of insured persons is established, it 
can guide policy formulation and ad
service delivery and sustainability of the NHIS in Ghana. This study therefore aimed at analysing the factors 
determining choice of healthcare providers of persons registered
Upper West Region of Ghana, based on the traditional consumer theory approach (Grossman, 1972; Muurinen, 
1982). 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Study Design 
The study uses primary data from two districts based on rur
in 2010. The stratified random sampling technique was employed due to the heterogeneous nature of the study 
population. Since the study focused on households, location (rural or urban) could have some im
household characteristics and socio-
behaviour of individuals within such households. In this wise, the Region was first stratified into rural and urban 
locations based on the population size (GSS, 2005) of the District capital. Following this, the Wa Municipality, 
Sissala East, Lawra and Jirapa Districts were categorized as urban because their capitals had population sizes 
exceeding 5000 while Nandowli, Sissala West, Wa
rural since the population size of their capitals were less than 5000 (GSS, 2005). The Wa Municipality and the 
Sissala West Districts were randomly selected from each category for the study.  
provider choice, is categorical, Bartlett II, Kotrlik and Higgins (2001) propose the use of Cochran’s sample size 
formula assuming an alpha of 0.05. 
( ) (
( )
2
2o
t p q
n
d
∗
=
Where  
no is the sample size to be determined
t is the value for selected alpha level of .025 in each tail = 1.96,
P is the proportion of the sample that became ill and sought treatment, 
q is the proportion that did not seek treatment and 
d = acceptable margin of error for proportion being estimate
accept). 
From a pilot survey conducted by the researchers, 0.75 proportion of households were ill and sought treatment. This 
gives p = 0.75 and q = 1-p =0.25, in which case the sample size becomes,
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The sample size of 288 was rounded up to 300 to take care of maximum error.  
 
To ensure representativeness, the sample size was distributed according to the proportion of households in the two 
locations in relation to total households
size which is 240 households was drawn from Wa Municipality while 20 percent of the sample size which represents 
60 households, was drawn from Sissala West District. Six commun
Municipality, while three communities were randomly selected from the Sissala West District. 
 
As there was no listing of houses or households, one household was interviewed from every 6
communities in Wa Municipal while one household was interviewed from every 4
communities in Sissala West because of the sparse distribution of houses in the latter than the former. Household 
heads or their representatives responded on beh
the 300 households.    
2.2 Data analysis 
The demand for healthcare like any other economic commodity follows the principles of utility theory. The ultimate 
role of utility is the determination of the welfare of individuals. In developing countries, h
to be important, both as a direct indicator of welfare and because of its possible impact on productivity. 
 
In the human capital tradition analysis of healthcare pro
individual demand factors given supply prices, environment, age and resources (including genes). As such, 
healthcare utilization is a derived demand for a service which is used to produce better h
1984). Health care is demanded as a means for consumers to achieve a larger stock of "health capital." 
 
Early attempts at modelling healthcare (the Grossman’s model) view each individual as both a producer and a 
consumer of health (Phelps, 1992). Health is treated as a stock which degrades over time in the absence of 
"investments", so that health is viewed as a sort of capital. As a commodity, healthcare thus satisfies both a 
consumption need, in that it yields direct satisfaction (
to consumers indirectly through increased productivity, fewer sick days, and higher wages. Investment in health is 
costly as consumers must trade off time and resources devoted to health, su
other goals. These factors are used to determine the optimal level of health that an individual will demand.  
 
In a given period of illness, patients or their relatives make healthcare consumption decisions in stag
stage is awareness of the illness. At this stage, the patient or a relative must decide whether to seek treatment for an 
illness. If the decision is to seek medical care, then the next decision is on the choice of source of treatment. The 
outcome of the choice at this point is a visit to a particular health facility (Odwee, Okurut & Adebua, 2006).  
Healthcare decisions are discrete in nature and their estimation therefore makes use of discrete choice formulations 
(Mwabu, Ainsworth & Nyamete, 1993). 
 
The direct utility derived by individual i from treatment alternative j is expressed as
  
( , )...............................(1)ij ij ij iU u h c=
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Where; ij
U
 is the direct conditional utility for individual i after receiving treatment from provider j, 
amount of healthcare received by individual i from provider j 
by individual i, the amount of which does not depend on choice j. 
 
The unobservable variable ij
h
is expressed as: 
  
( , ).................................(2)ij i ijh h x z=
Where; ij
h
is the amount of healthcare received by individual i from provider j, 
socio-economic attributes of individual i and 
Similarly i
c
can be expresses as;  
 
...................................(3)i i ijc y e= −
Where; i
c
 is consumption of non-health care goods by individual i which is independent of the cost of treatment for 
healthcare from provider j, iy  is annual income of individual i and 
devotes to care received from facility j. Expression (3) is merely an accounting identity, to permit identification of
ic
, a variable for which information is normally not collected in health care demand surveys.  
 
Assuming the utility function in Equation (1) is linear in health status and quadratic in consumption, and is consistent 
with well-ordered preferences, it will generate typically observed demand patterns. Given the role of prices, and a 
further assumption that consumer preferen
healthcare demands are said to be consistent with the assumption that ill individuals maximize an indirect conditional 
utility function, ij
V
as shown in Equati
     
 
( , , , , )..............................(4 )ij i j i i i ij iV v x z y r a=
Where; i
x
, 
i jz
and i
y
are as previously defined; 
health facility j and ia is the price of non
 
Equation (4) permits an investigation of direct demand effects of prices and incomes. In the present context, it shows 
the maximum utility that individual i can achieve, conditional on seeking treatment for an illness, controlling for 
income i
y
, health care prices i j
r
characteristics j
z
.    
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By their discrete nature, healthcare demand models can only identify the relative propensity of choosing one of the 
alternatives; consequently a normalization r
normalization purpose. For econometric application in this study, 
for all individuals; while j
z
 is redefined as access to a particular facility,
attributes and ij
r
as cost of healthcare from a particular facility. 
 
Furthermore all the elements of the indirect c
are the variables of interest to policymakers. The final step in econometric implementation of the model requires the 
standard assumption that the utility function in Equation (4) is s
     
Where,
*
jv
 is the systematic component of utility and 
 
Assuming i
µ
 is normally distributed; equation (5) leads to a multinomial 
healthcare services. The probability that individual i
 
( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 )i jP H
µ
=
∑
Equation (6) is the multinomial specification where, 
from provider j; ijH is healthcare provider alternatives from which individual i can seek treatment for j=1……..j=5 
and include 1= medical doctor, 2= medical assistant, 3= midwife/nurse, 4= Traditionalist, 5= self
and 
*
ijv are as previously defined. But 
*
i j i j i jv x z rβ φ λ= + +
Where the variables are as defined previously. In which case, equation (6) becomes
( ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (8 )
i j i j
i j i j
x z r
i
i j x z r
i
P H
β φ λ
β φ λ
µ
µ
+ +
+ +
=
∑
Where,
( )ijP H
, 
ijH
 and iµ  are as previously defined; 
i jr
respectively and ∑ is a summation sign. 
 
Based on the specification in (8), the specific equation used in estimating the determinants of provider choice among 
NHIS registered persons is specified as; 
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logit specification of individual choice of 
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*
*
i j
i j
v
i
v
iµ
( )ijP H is the probability that individual i will seek health care 
*
ijv
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( ) (9)
A LOS AR APF PAP TAF
i
ij A LOS AR APF PAP TAF
i
P F
β β β λ λ λ
β β β λ λ λ
µ
µ
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
=
∑
Where: P(Fij) is the probability of individual i choosing a particular provider j
level of schooling of the individual, measured in terms of educational attainment as in basic, secondary and so on; 
FOS measures how often the individual falls sick; IHH is the income level of the household head, measu
hundreds of Ghana cedis, AR is the age group of respondent; TTF is time taken in minutes to the facility; PXF is a 
dummy seeking to find out if the facility visited is the nearest; APF is the amount paid at the facility visited and is 
measured in Ghana cedis; PAP is household’s perception about payment; TAF is time taken (in minutes) at the 
facility visited and µ is the disturbance term. 
are the socio-economic attributes of the household. 
access variables. 1λ , 2λ  and 3λ  are the coefficients of APF, PAP and TAF respectively and are costs variables.
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Choice of Service Provider 
Table 1 represents the distribution of insured household members by healthcare provider
that self-medication recorded the highest patronage (27.43%) followed by the nurse (26.61%) and medical assistant 
(20.44%). Segregating the healthcare providers into orthodox and non
members consulted orthodox healthcare providers (medical doctor, medical assistant and nurse) while about 35% 
consulted non-orthodox healthcare providers (self
healers).  
 
The results thus show that non-orthodox sources of healthcare still remains important for persons insured under the 
NHIS in Ghana. Amaghionyeodiwe (2007) highlighted 
account for the tendency of people to self
behaviours of insured persons to vary depending on the stage of treatment, perceived severity of illness and types of 
additional health benefits. In general, factors such as education, age
amount paid for services, perception about the amount paid and waiting time taken at the facility have been found to 
influence household or individual choice of healthcare providers (Dzatora & Asafu
Aryeetey & kanbur, 2008; Nonvignon & Aglobitse, 2007).
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2 Determinants of Choice of Healthcare Providers
Equation (9) is estimated to determine the probability of a household member choosing either a particular heal
provider, conditional on level of schooling (LOS), age (AR), time taken to travel to facility (TTF), proximity to 
facility (PXF), amount paid for services at the facility (APF), perception about the amount paid (PAP) and time taken 
at the facility (TAF).  
 
First of all, the medical doctor was selected as the base outcome to compare how households
relative to the base outcome. The choice of the medical doctor is due to the fact that this option is the best available 
(at least scientifically proven) choice and it is interesting to find out the factors that are likely to cause people to go 
for other options instead of the best. 
The summary statistics from the estimated model indicate that the model had a good fit. Both the Cox and Sne
and the Nagelkerke R2 were above 0.7. These imply that about 70 percent variation in the choice of healthcare 
providers by household members can be attributed to variations in the variables included in the model. The Wald 
statistic of 194.35 was also significant at the 1 percent alpha level. This means that the likelihood of choosing a 
particular provider is statistically attributed to all explanatory variables included in the model. 
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All cost variables negatively affect preference for alternative pr
treatment for example negatively affects the tendency to seek care from alternative providers (B= 
as well as the tendency to self-treat (B= 
seeking treatment from a medical doctor than self
time spent at the facility seeking treatment also significantly affect the preference for the choice of a medical doctor
compared to other providers. People would rather spend more time seeking treatment from a medical doctor 
compared to seeking treatment from a medical assistant (B= 
traditionalist (B= -0.7913; p< 0.01) or self
Kamgnia (2008) that the most important reason for choosing health service providers is quality. People are therefore 
ready to pay to consult a doctor since by training the medical d
system.  
 
Similarly proximity to the facility had a negative effect on the preference for a medical doctor compared to 
alternative treatment (-1.5413, p< 0.05). These imply that access by distance to
especially when it comes to accessing treatment from medical doctors in the region. 
 
This stems from the fact that there are very few hospitals in the region (which are mostly in the regional and district 
capitals) and the road infrastructure in the region is so bad that people find it difficult commuting from one town or 
village to the other. Only two districts (Nandowli and Jirapa) are linked to the regional capital by tarred road, and 
this discourages commercial vehicles 
decisions to seek care from medical doctors. Findings by Ngugi (1999) points out that such indirect cost discourage 
the use of orthodox healthcare in general. However travel time 
alternative treatment (B=0.738, p< 0.05) compared to seeking treatment from a medical doctor. The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Even though the coefficients are useful in pointing the relativity i
the other, it does not indicate how various factors influence the likelihood to choose a particular provider. 
To come round with this the predicted probabilities were calculated from the coefficients. The
shows the probability that an insured person will resort to self
paid increased by one cedi. Thus even though it might be convenient for insured persons to walk into a chemical 
shop and prescribe medicines for themselves, such people will be less willing to do so if they have to pay a high 
price for the medicines. Perception about the amount paid had a positive effect on the probabilities of seeking 
healthcare from all providers but had a
amount spent doing self-medication is higher, the probability of self
 
Similarly the probability that one will seek treatment from all providers increased given 
an extra hour waiting for treatment. However the probability of self
spend an extra hour administering self
services of the doctor and the nurse only if they are prepared to spend more time at the facility. This research 
supports findings by Ngugi (1999), Amaghionyediwe (2008) and Aryeetey and Kanbur (Eds) (2008) 
seeking care both in terms of cash payment and time spent waiting for services affects the decision to seek care from 
a particular provider. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the determinants of choice of healthcare providers by insured persons on the National
Insurance Scheme in Ghana. The study concludes that insured persons tend to seek healthcare from both orthodox 
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and non-orthodox healthcare providers. Especially self
insured persons. Monetary and non-
National Health Insurance Scheme. This contradicts the notion in Ghana and elsewhere that insurance increases 
utilization of orthodox healthcare but confirms the negat
Kouadio et al, 2008; Odwee, Okurut and Adebua, 2006). Sensitization of Ghanaians in general is required to 
dissuade them from seeking self-treatment, which is done without proper diagnosis to estab
condition.  Insured persons as well as the non
providers before their conditions reach unmanageable levels. 
 
The current health portfolio under the National Health
services for efficient and effective healthcare delivery. Social and economic infrastructure such as roads, 
telecommunication, and health centres should be expanded and / or improved in some cases to 
healthcare providers more accessible, while at the same time reduce the demand for unorthodox healthcare and self
treatment among the insured persons.
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Table 2: Coefficients and marginal effects 
 
  
Var. Doctor Medical Assistant
 Marginal 
effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
effects
LOS -0.009 
(n/a) 
0.0357 
(0.760) 
-0.001 
(0.872)
AR -0.008 
(0.407) 
0.1870 
(0.151) 
0.008 
(0.281)
TTF 0.004 
(0.616) 
0.2081 
(0.591) 
0.033 
(0.130)
PXF -0.008 
(0.487) 
0.0058 
(0.990) 
-0.030 
(0.338)
AP 0.027 
(0.009) 
-0.4728 
(0.009) 
0.068 
(0.001)
PAP 0.012 
(0.096) 
-0.6133 
(0.110) 
-0.003 
(0.859)
TAF 0.027 
(0.002) 
-0.6368 
(0.008) 
0.056 
(0.001)
cons  4.2520 
(0.006) 
 
Log pseudo likelihood = -447.497               Wald chi
Cox & Snell R2 = 0.718                                Nagelkerke R
                                                                                                                                        
 
97 
of explanatory variables for provider 
 Nurse Traditionalist 
 
Coefficients Marginal 
effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
effects
 
0.0633 
(0.580) 
0.003 
(0.805) 
-0.0563 
(0.635) 
-0.005 
(0.224)
 
-0.0563 
(0.627) 
-0.024 
(0.021) 
0.2290 
(0.135) 
0.007 
(0.193)
 
-0.4287 
(0.292) 
-0.005 
(0.35) 
0.7538 
(0.054) 
0.045 
(0.001)
 
0.4421 
(0.327) 
0.016 
(0.699) 
-1.5413 
(0.006) 
-0.155 
(0.001)
 
-0.6154 
(0.001) 
0.131 
(0.001) 
-0.7909 
(0.001) 
0.025 
(0.028)
 
-0.3384 
(0.353) 
0.045 
(0.098) 
-0.4503 
(0.274) 
0.006 
(0.617)
 
-0.6203 
(0.004) 
0.133 
(0.001) 
-0.7913 
(0.004) 
0.026 
(0.008)
5.7511 
(0.001) 
 5.0336 
(0.001) 
 
2
 (78) = 207.84              Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
2
 = 0.761 
  www.iiste.org 
choice 
Self-medication 
 
Coefficients Marginal 
effects 
 
0.0558 
(0.607) 
0.004 
(0.747) 
 
0.1161 
(0.333) 
0.157 
(0.311) 
 
-0.2457 
(0.550) 
-0.037 
(0.520) 
 
0.6459 
(0.177) 
0.176 
(0.005) 
 
-1.6844 
(0.001) 
-0.251 
(0.001) 
 
-0.6675 
(0.073) 
-0.060 
(0.090) 
 
-1.6877 
(0.001) 
-0.242 
(0.001) 
10.735 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
